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DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS.
THE DOCTRINE THAT A CONTINUED POSSESSION BY THE
DONEE, AFTER THE ALLEGED GIFT, SIMILAR TO THAT BEFORE
THE ALLEGED GIFT, IS NOT SUFFICIENT DELIVERY TO CON-
STITUTE A VALID GIFT CAUSA MORTIs-How THIS DOCTRINE
IS APPLIED IN Davis v. Kuch (I9o4), SUPREME COURT OF
MINNESOTA, AND IN Drew v. Haggerty (1889>, SUPREMES
COURT OF MAINE-Davis v. Kuch AND Drew v. Haggerty Com-
PARED.-CoMMENTS.
Davis v. Kuch. Supreme Court, Minnesota. November 4,
i9O4. Appeal from District Court, Renville County. Gorham
Powers, J. Action by Merton Davis v. Henry Kuch. Verdict
for plaintiff: From an order denying a new trial defendant
appeals. The facts of the case follow:
NOTE
William Davis, father of plaintiff below, had cancer and was
confined to his bed at his residence. He and his family lived
on his farm, and William Davis a few months prior to his
death had executed a will by which he bequeathed all his real
estate to the children of his second marriage, subject to a life
estate in the mother. Thus no provision was made by the
will for plaintiff and his brother, children of Mr. Davis' first
marriage. At the trial plaintiff's brother testified that about
five days before Mr. Davis' death, while he was in a serious
condition and had been confined to his bed already about two
and a-half weeks, the following conversation took place in the
presence of plaintiff and his brother and their stepmother:
Q. What was said at the time by your father and brother regard-
ing this team?
A. He said to my brother he had never given him anything; he
would give him that team.
Q. What did your brother say?
A. My brother said he would take the team.
The team, which was the subject of the controversy, during
Mr. Davis' life was kept in the one barn on the premises and
was fed from the common supply. It was used by the father
up to the time of his sickness. Plaintiff, who had been home
off and on since he became of age seven years before Mr.
Davis' death, came home during the first week of his father's
illness and remained with him until his death. During this
time plaintiff cared for and fed the team and the day after the
alleged gift used the team -to drive to a nearby village for
medicine for his father. There was nothing further done,-
however, during the father's lifetime to ifndicate delivery and
acceptance of the team as a gift.
After his father's death plaintiff arranged with his brother
to care for the team, for which he would receive compensa-
tion during plaintiff's absence. Plaintiff stated he would
return shortly. Soon after his departure the widow claimed
the team as part of the personal estate, and 'it was set aside
as part of her allowance. Defendant claimed title through
the widow and refused to deliver the team, whereupon this
action of replevin was brought to secure possession.
The Court below submitted to the jury the question whether
or not there had been a gift of the property to the plaintiff
and instructed them as follows: To constitute a giff there
.must have been a delivery of the property, but that in such
case no absolute rule can be laid down as to what constitutes
sufficient delivery. The subject matter of the gift must be
considered in determining the character of delivery required.
NOTE
In this case Mr. Davis was bedridden, thus could not go out
and indicate the team in question, and make any sort of a
formal delivery.
The plaintiff was Mr. Davis' son, and had been accustomed
to reside with his father frequently and had been in fact resid-
ing with him prior to and during the time of making the
alleged gift; and under such circumstances, the law does not
require the same formality as to delivery as it might in some
other cases.
"Thus, where a donor and donee ***** reside together, as in
case of husband and wife, parent and child, it is not necessary that
things given should be removed from their common residence. It
is suffcient if it appear that the donor has relinquished.and the donee
acquired control of the property."
Thus under such circumstances, a formal delivery is not
necessary, and if in the jury's estimation a sufficient delivery
had been made, the title would pass to the plaintiff. *. * * *
The correctness of this discussion is called in question.
I. In deciding the question Judge Lewis first considered
whether a gift inter vivos or causa mortis was established.
(i.) To constitute a gift inter vivos there must be freedom
of will, the gift must be complete and irrevocable and must go
into immediate and absolute effect; the donor must be com-
petent to contract; and the property must be delivered by the
donor and accepted by the donee. In other words, the giftmusf be voluntary, gratuitous and absolute, and must be
delivered and accepted. 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d
Ed.), Ioi5, and cases there 
cited.
(2.) Redfield on Wills (Sec. 42) gives the following defi-
nition of a gift causa mortis:
"A gift of personal estate, made in prospect of death at no very
remote period, and which is dependent upon the condition of death
occurring substantially as .expected by the donor (i.e., if donor does
not in fact die, gift is revoked), and that the same be not revoked
before death."
(3-) By this it is seen that the two forms of gifts are prac-
tically the same in their requisites. Both must be voluntary,
gratuitous and complete, and there must be delivery and
acceptance. The one great distinction between the two is that
gifts inter vivos must be complete, absolute and irrevocable;
while gifts causa mortis though complete, are not absolute and
irrevocable, but conditional, taking effect only upon the death
of grantor, who may revoke such gift any time before death
and which are in fact revoked without his agency, if he does
not die.
NOTE
(4.) Judge Lewis then proceeds to weigh the circumstances
of the gift and the condition of donor at the time of the alleged
making of it. According to the evidence it is seen that the
donor was a doomed man laboring under a deadly disease-
cancer; he was confined to his bed and had been some two and
a-half weeks before the alleged gift; he was gradually getting
weaker and his death was the subject of conversation.
Therefore there can be very little doubt that the gift was
made in contemplation of approaching death, with the implied
condition that it would be revoked if donor should recover.
This gift must be treated, then, as causa mortis.
(5.) Judge Lewis here discusses the use of the words
would give" and "would accept" (as used by Mr. Davis and
plaintiff, respectively), with reference to an implied future gift
rather than an actual one at the time of the conversation. He
decides that these are rather the words of the witness than
those of the parties to the gift,--and that the words must be
taken to signify an immediate intention to make the gift and
accept it on the part of the donor and donee respectively.
(6.) The defendant relied on Allen v. Allen, 75 Minn. i x6, as
authority that according to the facts of the present case there
was not sufficient acceptance and delivery of the property to
make it a valid gift causa mortis. But Judge Lewis distin-
quishes the two cases by pointing out that in Allen v. Allen the
donee neither accepted the gift at the time it was conferred
nor exercised any acts of ownership over the property prior to
donor's death, while in the present case it was expressly stated
in plaintiff's brother's testimony that plaintiff accepted the
giftat the time of father's makingit and continued in possession
of it to extent of feeding and caring for team as usual.
(Q.) And now Judge Lewis comes to a point where he
decides quite flatly in opposition to the well-known case of
Drew v. Haggerty, 8i Me. 231.
Judge Lewis puts the proposition: "It may be conceded
that the donee's acts signifying dominion over the property did
not differ in any respect from those preceding the conferring
and accepting of the gift,-that he continued to feed and care
for the team as before.
"But does that make any difference, if such continued posses-
sion and exercise of dominion were all incidental to and not
incon.sistent with ownership- "
Drew v. Haggerty answers this question flatly in the affirma-
tive, while Judge Lewis answers it just as flatly in the negative.
Drew v. Haggerty holds that continued possession of the
same character after the conferring of a gift causa mortis as
that before the conferring of the gift will not constitute de-
livery. In other words, to the question: "Does it make any
difference that the character of the possession was the same
after the gift as it was before? Drew v. Haggerty would
answer: Yes, it does make a difference; in such cases there
would be no delivery; while Judge Lewis would answer: No,
it makes no difference.
Exercise of possession and dominion over the gift after
the conferring of it, even though such exercise is similar to
that before the conferring of the gift, constitutes a delivery;
and such delivery is just as effective as though the exercise
of possession and dominion after the gift differed from that
before it.
The Judge here cites Cain v. Moon, 2 Q. B. Div. 283, as being
in concurrence with his position.
Proceeding he says: "While true, a stricter rule should
be applied as to delivery in the case of a gift causa mortis
than with reference to gifts inter vivos, yet, as in this case,
when it appears that the gift was made in good faith, and the
only question is the sufficiency of delivery, we think it was fairly
a question for the jury to determine from all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case whether there was a sufficient accept-
ance and delivery. There was no error in the instruction of the
Court upon this branch of the case. The charge was ample,
and stated the law correctly."
II. On the second branch of the record Judge Lewis holds
that there was no evidence whereby the Court was called upon
to submit the charge to the jury that the burden of proof was
upon the plaintiff to show that the gift was not obtained by
undue influence, or that there was evidence in the case that the
father was of feeble mind.
III. The lower court was requested by defendant to charge:
(i.) "The jury are instructed that,.in order to constitute a valid
gift, there must be a taking possession under the gift; (2) that
the taking of the team for the purpose of going for medicine was
not necessarily a taking possession."
Judge Lewis said since the Court had already decided that a
continued possession was sufficient to constitute a delivery, no
new act under the gift was necessary; therefore, the first part
was rightly refused. As to second part, it was immaterial any-
how. There would have been no harm in submitting it as
the jury had a right to weigh all facts and circumstances, and
that the mere act of going for medicine with the team might
not of itself constitute sufficient taking possession, but as
it was merely one of the acts of continued possession, and as
there was evidence of many other such acts, the consideration




The facts in Drew v. Haggerty are as follows:
A husband made deposits in three savings banks, upon the
account of both himself and wife, of moneys which consisted of
their joint earnings for six years. The wife had kept the
bank books in her trunks for four years previous to her hus-
band's death.
There was evidence to show that he had given her the
whole of the three funds orally, while on his death-bed. The
plaintiff sues as administrator of the husband's estate, claiming
(inter alia) that this death-bed gift was invalid, there being
insufficient delivery and acceptance to constitute a valid gift
causa mortis. Counsel for the defendant contended that
since there was a clear intent to give, the books being in
defendant's hands, the gift was executed and perfected
i. e., there was no need of defendant's taking the books out
of her trunk and placing them in her husband's hands in order
that he might formally give them back again to her. The
husband recognized the fact that they were in her hands, where
he had placed them. This seems at least sound common-
sense reasoning, but in its decision the Supreme Court said
(per Walton J) :
"The most important question is whether the gift of a savings-bank
book, from husband to wife, causa mortis, is valid without delivery,
provided the book is at the time of the alleged gift already in the
possession of the .wife. The action (below) was tried before the
Chief Justice and he ruled that to constitute a valid gift, causa mortis,
there must be a delivery; that if the property be at the time already in
possession of the donee, the donor's saying to the donee 'You may have
it,' or 'You may keep it-it is yours,' does not pass the property in
the case of a gift, causa mortis. We think this ruling is correct."
This decision seems distinctly unjust at first glance. To
say that the dying husband must go through the formality of
actually handing the bank-books to his wife- in order that
her possession might become valid seems, at any rate in
this particular case, absurd. However, a little further along
in his opinion, Judge Walton says:
"Without an act of delivery, an oral disposition of property, in con-
templation of death, could be sustained only as a nuncupative will; and
in the manner and with the limitations provided for such wills. De-
livery is also important as evidence of deliberation and intention. It
is a test of sincerity and distinguishes idle talk from serious purpose.
And it makes fraud and perjury more difficult. Mere words are easily
misrepresented. Even the change of an emphasis may make them
convey a meaning different from what the speaker intended. * * * *
Gifts causa mortis ought not to be encouraged. They are often
NOTE
sustained by fraud and perjury. * * * It is far better that occasionally
a gift of this kind should fail than that the rules of law be so relaxed
as to encourage fraud and perjury."
Now this is certainly eminently sound and logical reasoning,
both from a lay and legal point of view. The decision
seems perfectly correct; though it may be hard in this par-
ticular case.
Yet, in view of the circumstances, so does the decision in
Davis v. Kuch appear to be perfectly just and correct.
But the two cases give flatly opposite answers to the ques-
tion: Does it make any difference that the character of the
possession was the same after the gift as it was before?
It must be admitted that Drew v. Haggerty, strictly speak-
ing represents the best law on this point; however, if this
rule had been strictly adhered to by Judge Lewis, in Davis v.
Kuch, we would have been brought to the absurd, position
of saying that either a 'sick man must arise and making his
way to the barn, formally present his son with the team of
horses, or that the son must immediately, on his father's
oral gift, announce formally to the world at large in some
manner, which I for one would be at a loss to indicate, that
he has accepted the gift; that the team is his. And it is not
likely that a person or persons, non-conversant with the law,
would, at such a time, even think of going through any such
actions, much less actually go through them.
Which horn of the dilemma are we then to accept? Shall
we say with Judge Lewis that when the gift takes place
between husband and wife, or between members of a family or
persons intimately connected in life, the rule must be relaxed?
This sentence occurs in Drew v. Haggerty:
"Now the law is even more particular about the evidence of
delivery, when a gift is claimed between a wife and husband, or
between members of a family where there is an opportunity to
create evidence falsely or the appearance of evidence" (and such
opportunities to bring undue influence to bear).
*a *a * * * *a *a * *a *
This certainly cannot be disputed.
Here then, is the position: A well-recognized, well-estab-
lished rule of law, resting firmly on precedent and authority,
A set of facts and circumstances which do not admit of
having the rule strictly applied to them; else an absurd and
unjust decision would resulf.
Rules of law must not be lightly cast aside. They are the
well-tested, time-honored means to the end of justice, which
NOTE 447
men have found reliable through long use. But when a rule
fails us as a means to a desired end must we not lay it aside,
or at least make the exception that perchance may prove the
rule ?
Let Drew v. Haggerty and Davis v. Kuch stand then; oppo-
site each other, indeed, but perhaps by their very contrast
serving the better to light that obscure path by which we
grope for that which, in the last analysis, we are striving
for-namely, Justice.
Joseph Chapman.
